BlogWonks

 Last week over 700 law enforcement personnel, intelligence professionals, and private sector officials attended the Terrorism and Transportation Conference convened in New York, New York, hosted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Homeland Security Department’s Transportation Security Administration. This four-day conference was held to bring together terrorism first responders, private industry security managers, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) experts. The event was the largest-ever sponsored by the FBI and TSA to jointly address terrorism and transportation.

Keynote speakers included FBI New York Division Assistant Director in Charge Mark Mershon, TSA Administrator Kip Hawley, New York Police Department Commissioner Raymond Kelly, United States Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen, and The Port Authority of New York/New Jersey Police Superintendent Samuel J. Plumeri, Jr.

Invited panelists addressed prevention, preparedness, and response to terrorist acts involving buses, airplanes, subways, freight trains, shipping, and other transportation modes, with an emphasis on law enforcement coordination, cooperation, preparedness, and prevention.

Members from several federal, state, and local law enforcement departments and private industry partners participated in the conference. In addition, international law enforcement officials were in attendance from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

“Unfortunately, 9/11 changed the way the world thinks about their vulnerability aboard airliners. Tokyo, Madrid, and London further illustrated that the rails and buses were not immune from terrorist attack,” said Assistant Director Mershon.

“Our goal is to make certain we coordinate to the fullest extent possible with our law enforcement partners, including first responders and WMD experts. We want to ensure preparedness in combating the growing threat of transportation sector terrorism ,”  he said.

“Counterterrorism today is a team activity. TSA’s strategy is to start with intelligence; partner with law enforcement, airports, our international colleagues and industry partners, and the public; and use security measures that are flexible, widely deployable, mobile, and layered to cover our open transportation network. If the terrorists’ strength is that they have no deadlines, rules, or borders, ours is that this is our turf, there are a lot of us, and we have a lot of resources,” said TSA Administrator Kip Hawley.

The Future Combat System (FCS) program — which comprises 14 weapons systems and a state-of-the-art information network — is the centerpiece of the Army’s effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force.

The substantial technical challenges, the Army’s acquisition strategy, and the cost of the program are among the reasons why the program is recognized as needing special oversight and review by members of the US Congress. Section 211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires that appropriate members of Congress receive annual reports about the FCS program.

The progress made during the year by the FCS program, in terms of knowledge gained, is commensurate with a program in early development. Yet, the knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its budget.

This may lead to additional cost increases and delays as FCS begins what is traditionally the most expensive and problematic phase of systems’ development. The FCS’s demonstrated performance, as well as the reasonableness of its remaining resources, will be paramount during the 2009 milestone review for the FCS program. In the key areas of defining and developing FCS capabilities, requirements definition and preliminary designs are proceeding but not yet complete; critical technologies are immature; complementary programs are not yet synchronized; and the remaining acquisition strategy is very ambitious.

Beginning in 2008, the Army planned to make a series of commitments to produce FCS-related systems in advance of the low-rate production decision for the FCS core program in 2013. In general, production commitments are planned before key information is available.

In 2008 and 2009, the Army plans to begin funding production of the first of three planned spin outs of FCS technologies to current forces. However, its commitment to the first spin out may be made before testing is complete.

Also starting in this year, the Army intends to begin the production of early versions of the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. This commitment is being made to respond to congressional direction to field the cannon. FCS technologies, network, and designs are not yet mature enough for production, and thus the cannons produced will not be deployable without significant modifications.

Advance procurement funding for the first full suite of FCS systems will begin in fiscal year 2011, the budget for which will be presented to Congress in February 2010–less than a year after the milestone review and before the stability of the FCS design is assessed at the critical design review. In addition, the Army plans to commit to using Boeing, its lead system integrator, for the early production of FCS systems through the initial production phase of the FCS system of systems.

By the time of the production decision in 2013, $39 billion will have already been invested in FCS, with another $8 billion requested. Thus, while demonstration of the FCS’s capability falls late in the schedule, commitments to production are likely to come early–an untenable situation for decision makers.

The Army’s $160.9 billion cost estimate for the FCS program is largely the same as last year’s but yields less content as the number of FCS systems has since been reduced from 18 to 14. There is not a firm foundation of knowledge for a confident cost estimate. Also, two independent cost assessments are significantly higher than the Army’s estimate. However, the Army maintains that it will further reduce FCS content to stay within its development cost ceiling.

Should the higher cost estimates prove correct, it seems unlikely that the Army could reduce FCS content enough to stay within the current funding constraints while still delivering a capability that meets requirements.

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he’s a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org). In addition, he’s the new editor for the House Conservatives Fund’s weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty.

He’s former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed “Crack City” by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations. He’s also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He’s a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He’s also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he’s syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He’s appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri’s own website is located at http://jimkouri.us

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect US programs from fraud, waste, and abuse.

Since 2003, the Government Accountability Office has issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies to the House of Representatives. Their latest report addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN); and the Iraqi government. GAO analysts also made multiple trips to Iraq.

U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces. However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts.

For example, in a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million in costs questioned by auditors.

Also in July 2007, GAO found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation to determine what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program.

However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination. The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere.

Several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and role of contractors.

The GAO’s work has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts. GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD’s management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations.

However, GAO has found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild Iraq’s energy sector and $300 million to develop its government ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts.

Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq can effectively govern, rebuild, and stabilize the country. Rebuilding Iraq’s energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can pay for these tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people. However, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan, U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction.

The creation of a plan for the energy sector is also essential for Iraq to meet energy production and export goals. GAO recommended to Congress that the State Department work with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, should act on GAO’s recommendations.

Given the billions of dollars provided to rebuild Iraq’s energy sector and the limited capacity of Iraqi ministries, GAO believes that its recommendations are still valid.

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he’s a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org). In addition, he’s the new editor for the House Conservatives Fund’s weblog. Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty.

He’s former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed “Crack City” by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations. He’s also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He’s a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He’s also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he’s syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He’s appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri’s own website is located at http://jimkouri.us

US military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including the support of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 US Army and Marine Corps service members deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members, according to the Department of Defense.

To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness.

In addition, DOD’s annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs.

While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and US forces have gained considerable combat experience, reports have shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions.

For example, to maintain deployed force levels, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from non-deploying units and pre-positioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for non-deployed units to meet other demands.

In addition, they have refocused training units extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. The DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel.

If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, the Government Accounting Office has reported on a wide range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD’s ability to manage and improve readiness.

Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and demands on US military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuilding readiness will be a long-term and complex effort.

However, the GAO believes the Defense Department can take measures that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. A common theme is the need for DOD to take a more strategic decision-making approach to ensure programs and investments are based on plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress.

Overall, the GAO recommended that DOD develop a near-term plan for improving the readiness of ground forces that, among other things, establishes specific goals for improving unit readiness, prioritizes actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly link resource needs and funding requests.

The GAO also made recommendations in several specific readiness-related areas, including that DOD develop equipping strategies to target shortages of items required to equip units preparing for deployment, and DOD adjust its training strategies to include a plan to support full-spectrum training. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them.

For others, particularly when GAO recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe such plans are needed.

Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he’s a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org). Kouri also serves as political advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty.

He’s former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed “Crack City” by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security for several major organizations. He’s also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri writes for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He’s a news writer for TheConservativeVoice.Com and PHXnews.com. He’s also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he’s syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He’s appeared as on-air commentator for over 100 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News, etc. His book Assume The Position is available at Amazon.Com. Kouri’s own website is located at http://jimkouri.us